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Abstract. Success in human-agent interaction will to a large extent
depend on the ability of the system to cooperate with humans over
repeated tasks. It is not yet clear how cooperation between humans and
virtual agents evolves and is interlinked with the attribution of qualities
like trustworthiness or competence between the cooperation partners. To
explore these questions, we present a new interaction game framework
that is centered around a collaborative puzzle game and goes beyond
commonly adopted scenarios like the Prisoner’s dilemma. First results
are presented at the conference.
1 Introduction
With advances in human–agent interaction and artificial intelligence, future
interactions with technical systems are likely to be shaped like a cooperation
between partners with complementary competencies [2]. In such teams, each
agent has some degree of autonomy to handle dynamic situations and to make
decisions within uncertain situations. One central question is: what does it require
for a human to be willing and able to cooperate with a computer? We take further
steps to investigate the potential of virtual agents to support cooperation. We
focus in particular on the central factors trustworthiness and competence and
how they develop in, and influence an ongoing human–agent cooperation. We
consider trustworthiness as the agents ability to signal reliability in terms of
benevolent intentions [3], and we seek to analyze how it is intertwined with the
user’s perception of the agent’s competence.
2 Theoretical Background
Cooperative interaction moved into focus of HCI with a paradigm shift from
using computers as mere tools, to interacting with them as intelligent and
autonomous partners that resemble human-like counterparts [5, 2]. Hoc [4] argued
that cooperative situations are shaped by a) both agents’ ability to interfere
with each other on goals, resources, etc. (thus requiring coordination) and by
b) the management of interference, for example to support the other agents
tasks. To further promote the development of cooperative agents, it is crucial to
understand when and how cooperation emerges in scenarios that are dynamic,
extend over many interactions, and afford communication via various social
signals. Thus far, cooperative behavior is primarily investigated using idealized
cooperative games originating from behavioral game theory (BGT). However,
cooperative games such as the Prisoner’s dilemma, although well-established, are
limited in scope and ecological validity when it comes to studying issues like
competence and trustworthiness and how they evolve in a scenario with richer
interaction. These game scenarios are on purpose kept very limited, with various
variations and modifications applied, e.g. recasting the Prisoner’s dilemma into
an investment game, or allowing emotional feedback. Aside from making binary
decisions (cooperate: yes/no) or allocating money between both players, the
decision spaces and possibilities to interact in a meaningful way are confined.
Although the BGT approach has yielded remarkable results, it is difficult to
model and examine cooperative human–agent interactions with cooperative
games alone in the long run because they cannot sufficiently model settings that
comprise cooperative elements of HCI such as the formation of teams, solving a
collaborative task, or rich communication. We argue that a framework that allows
for modeling and studying cooperation in human–agent interaction in a more
realistic and valid, yet controllable and manageable way is still lacking. From our
point of view, such a framework has to meet at least the following requirements:
(R1) goal interdependence, (R2) evocation and observation of various key factors
(e.g. trust/trustworthiness, cooperativeness, competence, willingness to take risks,
believability, emotions), (R3) ability to communicate and coordinate between
the agent, (R4) identification of utilities assigned to decisions, (R5) possibility to
introduce agent embodiment, (R6) algorithmically feasible automatization, (R7)
possibility to assign different roles to players.
3 An Interactive Cooperative Puzzle Game
We have developed an interaction framework that allows us to operationalize,
manipulate and analyze the relevant factors and key characteristics of cooperative
behavior in a systematic fashion (see Fig. 1). The general setting includes two
players solving a puzzle game interactively. Inspired by Tetris R©, the interaction
scenario consists of a board where two players work together to place blocks of
various shapes, using horizontal movements and rotation. In our game, blocks do
not move down gradually and filled lines are not cleared. The former gives us the
ability to manipulate the available time per round (difficulty), the latter simplifies
the implementation of an algorithm that enables a virtual agent to participate
as autonomous player. There are further reasons why we chose this puzzle game:
First, it is relatively easy to implement a heuristic to find optimal solutions for
an agent (R6). By adapting the underlying heuristic, we are thereby able to
manipulate the agents behavior and thus, presumably, its perceived competence
(R2). Second, we can induce both individual goals (e.g. as an individual score
for a block a player has placed) as well as cooperative goals (as a team score for
lines that get completely filled). This enables us to analyze if a player prioritizes
Fig. 1. Concept of the puzzle game interface with a virtual agent as cooperation partner.
The agent can display multimodal behavior or other contextual social cues. This allows
for analyzing which type of feedback cue (verbal, sad or regretful facial expression) has
what differential effect on the ongoing cooperation.
one over the other as a measure of cooperativeness (R1). Third, by changing
factors such as field size, time constraints, block shapes, or block scores we can
manipulate the difficulty of achieving the cooperative goal. Finally, we can at all
times fully observe the game state.
Two different player roles are introduced in an asymmetric setup of the game
(R7): a recommender and a decider. Each round consists of the following steps:
1) The recommender picks one out of two blocks he wants to recommend to
the decider. 2) The decider picks a block by either accepting or rejecting the
recommendation and places it on the board. 3) The recommender places the
remaining block. Both players receive points individually for every block they
place. The complex block gives more points than the simple one, leading to an
individual benefit in placing more complex blocks (R4). In addition, both players
obtain points when a certain amount of lines are completely filled horizontally.
We refer to this as cooperative or joint goal since it can only be achieved if the
players cooperate with each other by recommending and choosing blocks that
minimize the occupied space, and by placing them in a reasonable way. The
three actions occurring in this scenario – recommendations, (not) complying with
recommendations, and placing blocks – relate to different behavioral factors (R2):
recommendations and compliance are indicative of competence, trust, and pursued
goals. For example, if the recommender constantly recommends the complex
block this could be interpreted as a high level of trust in the partner, pursuit of an
altruistic goal, but also as low level of competence of the recommender himself. In
contrast, if the recommender always recommends the simple block this could be
interpreted as low level of trust or pursuit of a selfish goal. Interpretations of the
actions of the decider are quite similar. Still, one cannot always tell if the decider
follows a recommendation or would have decided for the block anyway. The block
placing may serve as indicator for level of competence, except for cases where
players deliberately try to minimize their partners score by misplacing blocks.
Note that in this framework, (non-)cooperation is strategic and requires more
than a binary decision. Although the decision-making process in the often used
social dilemmas is also complex, the final action translates to ”I (do not) want
to cooperate”. In contrast, we expect the degree of cooperativeness the decider
signals to the recommender to depend on a) the decider’s puzzle solving skills, and
b) the intention the decider signals by (not) complying with the recommender’s
advice. As a result, how is a decider perceived who performs well but only rarely
accepts recommendations, or who accepts the recommendations but performs
poorly? The perceived cooperativeness of the decider, then, should relate to the
recommender’s willingness to cooperate with him [1]. An experimental study
where participants played as recommender and a non-embodied agent acted as
decider showed that perceived competence, trustworthiness, and cooperativeness
of the decider were differentially affected by its puzzle solving skills and the
degree to which it accepted recommendations.
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